**Ethics of autonomous weapon systems (AWS).** Being ethical is not the same as doing whatever society accepts.

# Abstract

In academic literature on the ethics and law of AWS the consensus is call for regulation. In theoretical terms, law and norms co-constitute each other but are not identical. However, ‘the literature fails to consider that practices related to the development, testing and training, or usage of AWS outpace public, governmental, and legal considerations. AWS may shape norms in practice by privileging procedural norms that are detached from deliberative processes’. So it is incumbent on those who are developing AWS to remain vigilant and promote ethical design methodologies, that will ultimately become those procedural norms.

# Academics

There is a gulf between academic vs. government and industry. In public forums, general consensus among academics calling for a ban on AWS [cite]. UN Charter and Geneva Convention and Ban on Conventional Weapon Systems (CBRN, cluster bombs), Rules of War: norms on proportionality and rules of war.

# Conventional Frameworks

conventional frameworks of law/ethics have difficulties to accommodate flexibility and change for structural reasons, we demonstrated that it is necessary to consider other types of norms that are not accounted for in research on AWS. There has been media attention and civil society organisations or campaigns such as Article 36, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, or the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) seek to raise the issue’s profile.

# Fait accompli

But AWS deployment is practical fait accompli in the near future. ‘dual-purpose technology’ supported by states UK, China, Korea, Russia, Australia [Cite robotics roadmap]. Failure of AWS ban because *autonomy* itself is ill-defined and too broad in scope [Scharre]. Furthermore, the development of AWS is *‘accelerating largely outside of public and academic attention in the discipline of International Relations’* (Bode). The widely unaccounted development of AWS has impeded deep public discourse on this issue.

Need for AWS outpaces call for restraint.

# Ethical arguments against AWS

1. Accounbility. *legitimacy is often linked to public demands of individual and political responsibility when force is used, particularly in cases that challenge norms of humanitarian law.65 The increasing autonomy of weapons systems raises the question to what extent different groups of individuals, engineers and programmers, political decision-makers, or military command and operating staff, are accountable for ‘decisions’ undertaken and mistakes committed by AWS*. Success here will be evaluated in real-time: regulation of big tech companies being held accountable for the side-effects of their products.
2. War requires human consciousness to imbue war with human dignity.
3. Appropriateness:

# Whose AWS Procedural Norm?

propose studying AWS in the context of two different, but interrelated normative spheres: the legal-public sphere – the primary realm of fundamental norms; and the procedural-organisational sphere – the primary realm of procedural norms.

‘a shared expectation about behavior, a standard of right or wrong’, 83 thereby linking norms to what is morally ‘right’. While this is certainly a key quality of norms, we argue for a broader understanding. Norms as standard of appropriateness can also comprise functional aspects such as efficiency and effectiveness in specific settings. A procedural norm in the military, for example, does not necessarily meet universal, public understandings of the morally ‘right’.

IEEE design methodology. Legal-public norms, including public expectations in terms of (political) accountability, lawfulness, or transparency.

For the military. . Operating AWS is very much based on procedural norms – they are governed by an emerging. As mentioned previously, the US drone program shows how new standards of ‘appropriate’ warfare may emerge in international relations.

Primary research

# Evaluation of Procedural Norms: BAE, Lockheed, Anduril, Boeing, AWS, Google, Microsoft, Palantir, Northrop, Kratos

# Evaluation of Procedural Norms: Chinese, Russian, Israeli, European, Australian, Middle Eastern. Countries (see response to AWS bans), See robotoics and autonomy strategies, see companies.

These are completely opaque to academia. Need a proxy metric.

# Citations

Bode *Autonomous weapons systems and changing norms in international relations*